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Judges and Judgment: In Praise of Instigators 
Kathryn Judge* 
 
This essay celebrates judicial instigators, and Judge Richard Posner as instigator.  It 
embraces a view of the judicial system as a system, one that can best achieve its myriad 
aims only if there is some variety in its constituent parts. Having some judges, some of the 
time, willing to ask hard questions about what the law is and should be is critical to 
ensuring the law achieves its intended aims.  This essay illustrates this point by weaving 
together a single case about mutual fund fees with personal observations accumulated over 
a year as a clerk to Judge Posner and Posner’s writings about how he judges. This 
analysis paints Posner as a jurist aware of his own humanity, attuned to the humanity of 
those before him, and willing to allow both to shape his judgment.  This particular breed 
of pragmatism, and Posner’s willingness to openly question a law’s aims and effects, often 
enabled him to tee up issues in ways that enhanced the law.  The judicial system would 
not be well served if all judges were carbon copies of Judge Posner, but it is far better off 
today because of his thirty-five years on the bench. 
 
Introduction  
This paper is about mutual funds.  Because of that, it may put many to sleep long 
before we get to the heart of the matter.   I encourage you right now to stay awake, or at 
least keep one eye propped open. For embedded in this story about mutual funds, rent 
seeking, the challenge of separating the good and the bad, and the even greater challenge 
of respecting autonomy in an environment where so many choices seem to be bad ones, is 
the story of a judge.  That judge is the Honorable Richard A. Posner, aka RAP, Dick, 
Professor Posner, the one to be feared, the one to be revered, the one who inspires, the 
one who causes many to perspire, and the one who somehow gets it right even when he is 
wrong (and he is sometimes wrong).  It is a story of how he judges.  It is a story of 
curiosity and truth seeking.  It is a story of respecting process and precedent while not 
being overly constrained by convention or rules.  It is also a story of constantly seeing 
things anew, even when that requires letting go of views that seemed true when first 
embraced.  It is a story of positionality and insight and law and humanity, and the 
perfection of embracing imperfection.  It is a story of using stories to help others to see, 
and the power and limits of such methods.    
Although this may all sound a little too new-agey to possibly be an account of 
Judge Richard Posner, let me assure you that there are reasons to use this type of 
language to understand who he is and how he judged.  And let me further assure you that 
in the process of trying to uncloak something new about the brilliant and prolific Judge 																																																								
* Professor of Law, Columbia University, ECGI.  The author would like to thank John 
Coates, John Morley, and Quinn Curtis for helpful comments, Christian Ronald for 
excellent research assistance and Lawrence Lessig and Jesse Eisinger for inspiration.  
Mistakes are mine alone. 
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Posner, this paper will also seek to unmask something of how our legal system does and 
should work.  For although there never will be another Judge Posner, his approach to 
judging holds lessons for all of us.  I will suggest that much of Judge Posner’s depth came 
not from his remarkable mind but his steadfastness in not allowing the legend that grew 
up around him to blunt his curiosity or contort his view of himself.  Although not one for 
false modesty, he conscientiously, even if not consciously, avoided living on a cloud.  The 
heart of what makes him a legend is less his brilliant intellect than his wisdom.  And, 
fortunately for the rest of us, a mind need not be anywhere near as sharp as his to learn 
something from his capacity to hold tensions—humility enabled by utter self assurance; 
fairness through allowance for difference; transcendence that rests upon and is grounded 
in human fallibility.  Most importantly, for purposes of this essay, was his treatment of the 
law as a corpus both greater than but inherently of the people who make it and in whose 
service it is deployed. 
In a methodology that can be defended only by the meekness of the conclusions it 
supports, this paper weaves together the evolution of one case with Judge Posner’s writing 
about judging and some personal observations to speculate on why the law needs more 
individuals like Judge Posner.  Alongside doing right by litigants in any individual suit, 
producing “good” law is a critical function of the judicial system.  Recognizing a 
particular court’s position within a multi-tiered judicial system, and situating that system 
within a governance regime that imposes frictions on legislative and regulatory action, is 
critical to assessing what is and is not appropriate action for judges.  Given ongoing 
learning, changing environments, and the potential for law to take form in the backwaters 
without anyone focusing on what it should be, the law should sometimes evolve.  Judges 
that sit below the top of the hierarchy can aid this process by sometimes serving as 
instigators, flagging areas where the law is ill suited to the task at hand.  This is but one 
role, and should not always triumph, but also should not be ignored.  The occasional 
pragmatic instigator may stir up some trouble, but she can also play a critical role keeping 
the law alive.  Allowing some judges, some of the time, to ask the tough questions about 
what the law and ought to be even when resolving a case does not so necessitate is critical 
to the health of the law.  The core claim is thus a call to embrace instigators as an 
essential element of, rather than an affront to, an effective judiciary. 
On the offhand possibility that you are wondering what any of this has to do with 
mutual funds, let me cut to the chase.  The backbone of this paper is a case about 
whether a mutual fund investment advisor breached a fiduciary duty owed to its investors 
by charging too high of a fee for its services.  This is a tricky area of the law, as most 
actively managed mutual funds charge fees in excess of what their returns can justify, and 
yet investors keep buying them.  The case was decided by three of Judge Posner’s 
colleagues on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  Had it not been for Judge Posner, 
the case likely would have died there.  But Judge Posner, never one to minimize his 
workload, decided to read that opinion when the lawyers took the often pro forma step of 
seeking a rehearing.  And despite (or perhaps because) the unanimous opinion had been 
authored by Judge Easterbrook, Judge Posner decided that the reasoning was suspect and 
the case should be heard en banc.  Four judges joined his dissent arguing that Judge 
Easterbrook had created a circuit split without so acknowledging and the case deserved 
the attention of the full Seventh Circuit.  Although not enough to get the case heard en 
banc, the opinion did get the attention of the Supreme Court. The Court granted cert 
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and soundly rejected Judge Easterbrook’s approach, albeit in a narrow decision that 
largely reverted the law to where it stood before either Posner or Easterbrook got 
involved.   
With respect to the law governing mutual funds, the Supreme Court’s decision 
was a missed opportunity, but no great tragedy.  Others have written, in great detail, on 
the mechanics of mutual fund fee litigation and the significance of the various opinions 
rendered in this case.1 The account here addresses these issues, but only as a means 
rather than an end.  The paper instead uses this dispute as a lens into lawmaking—the 
role of courts and particular judges on those courts, the role of lawyers who bring suits 
and those who defend against them, and the role of Congress, as both body and 
construct, in how judges apply laws that Congress adopts.  Following in the spirit of Judge 
Posner, and hence exercising my prerogative to project onto Posner things he might 
never say himself, I will argue that Judge Posner embodies the importance of boldness 
and individualism to the law, and humble pragmatists may be particularly good in this 
role.   
I. The Case 
a. The Setup 
We live in a world where many actively managed mutual funds are a scam.  Not 
in a Bernie Madoff-type way.  Most asset managers are not fraudsters and few regulated 
funds are Ponzi schemes.  Many mutual fund advisors believe, quite fervently, in the 
value of the work they are doing.  Some are even right to believe that they create value.  
Nonetheless, the overall picture is bleak. Herd behavior is common.2  Eugene Fama and 
Kenneth French find that “on average, active mutual funds do not produce gross returns 
above (or below) those of passive benchmarks,” which is bad news for investors given the 
higher fees for active funds.3 Another recent study found that  “over the 10-year 
investment horizon, 85.36% of large-cap managers, 91.27% of mid-cap managers, and 
90.75% of small-cap managers failed to outperform” the relative benchmark, and the 
performance was almost as bleak when evaluating their performance over shorter time 
horizons.4  And, even a recent study suggesting that mutual fund managers do create 																																																								
1 See, for example, M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U Chi L Rev 1027 (2010); 
John C. Coates IV, The Downside of Judicial Restraint: The (Non-)Effect of Jones v. Harris, 6 
Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 58 (2010); John Morley and Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights 
Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L J 84 
(2010); Quinn Curtis and John Morley, The Flawed Mechanics of Mutual Fund Fee Litigation, 
32 Yale J Reg 1 (2015); Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund 
Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 Vand. L Rev. 497 (2008). 
2 Martijn Cremers, et al, Indexing and Active Fund Management: International Evidence, 120 J 
Financial Econ 539 (2016); Richard W. Sias, Institutional Herding, Rev. Fin. Studies 164 
(2004). 
3 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R French, Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund 
Returns, 65 J Finance 1915, 1916 (2010). 
4 Aye M. Soe and Ryan Poirier, SPIVA U.S. Scorecard: Mid-Year 2016, 1 (S&P Global 
2016), http://media.spglobal.com/documents/SPGlobal_Indices_Article_15-September-
2016_SPIVA+US+Mid-Year+Scorecard.pdf.   
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value, finds no evidence that the value created is passed onto investors rather than 
captured as rents.5 
After the 2008 financial crisis, investors seemed to wake up these facts, as reflected 
in the rapid growth of lower fee index funds and passive ETFs.6  Nonetheless, roughly 
$10 trillion remains invested in actively managed mutual funds.  That’s right: $10 trillion 
flowing through funds that charge fees that in nine of out ten cases swamp any value 
provided.7  That market and those fees are what’s at stake in this case. 
Mutual funds sold to the public, whether open or closed, active or passive, are 
regulated as “registered investment companies,” a status created by the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.  This Act imposes a range of requirements on such funds, while 
largely exempting private funds, like hedge funds and private equity funds, sold only to 
institutions and very wealthy individuals.  The notion that investment advisers have “a 
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services,” was added as Section 36(b) 
of the Act, in 1970.8  A little more than a decade later, the Second Circuit held in 
Gartenberg v Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc9 that this obligation included a duty not to 
charge excessive fees for the services provided and promulgated a six-factor test for 
determining whether fees are excessive.10  Most courts subsequently confronted with a 
Section 36(b) claim have followed some version of the Gartenberg test.11 Section 36(b) 
liability was thus a largely settled, even if not particularly satisfying, area of law until 
2009.  
b. The Seventh Circuit Debate      
In 2009, Judge Easterbrook and two colleagues heard an appeal from Jerry Jones 
and other owners of Oakmark mutual funds claiming that the adviser to Oakmark funds 
had breached its Section 36(b) fiduciary obligations.12  Judge Easterbrook agreed with the 																																																								
5 Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry, 
118 J. Fin. Econ. 1, 16 (2015) (finding that the average mutual fund manager does create 
value, but that “the average net alpha across all funds is not significantly different from 
zero, so there is no evidence that investors share in the fruits of this skill”).  
6 For why this raises new concerns, see Charles Stein, Active vs. Passive Investing (Bloomberg, 
Dec 4, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/active-vs-passive-investing. 
7 In previous work, I’ve offered a novel explanation for the amount of money flowing into 
such funds, suggesting that we can best understand these decisions as influenced by stock 
brokers and other intermediaries who regularly help retail investors wade through the 
nearly ten thousand mutual fund choices available, and who earn extra when their clients 
buy expensive funds.  See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U Chi L Rev 573 
(2015); Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 Iowa L Rev 1517 (2013). 
8 15 USC § 80a-35(b); Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-
547, 84 Stat 1413 (1970), codified in various sections of Title 15 (emphasis added). 
9 694 F2d 923 (2d Cir 1982). 
10 Id at 928. 
11 See Jones v Harris Associates LP, 559 US 335, 343 (2010) (noting that “until the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision below, something of a consensus had developed regarding the standard 
set forth over 25 years ago in Gartenberg”). 
12 See Jones v Harris Associates LP, 527 F3d 627 (7th Cir 2008). 
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lower court that the case should be dismissed, but he also went out of his way to 
“disapprove” of the Garternberg standard relied on by the district court.13  According to 
Easterbrook, “[a] fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation.”14  In his assessment, this 
means that Section 36(b) creates a robust disclosure requirement and outlaws chicanery, 
but otherwise leaves to market forces the task of limiting the fees that mutual fund 
advisers charge their clients.  He buttresses this position by analogizing the process 
through which mutual fund adviser fees are set to the processes establishing executive 
compensation. And he concludes by pointing to evidence that hedge fund managers are 
paid far more than mutual fund managers, making it “hard to conclude that Harris’s fees 
must be excessive.”15 
The opinion has many Posner-like characteristics.  It is courageous.  It raises 
questions beyond those presented by the parties.  It opts for a sweeping holding when a 
more narrow one would suffice.  And it does so in the spirit of improving the law.  In 
Easterbrook’s view, a fiduciary obligation, even one specific to compensation, is not 
sufficient to entangle judges in the messy business of second guessing a price set in a 
market that, at least in some dimensions, is exceptionally competitive.    
Judge Posner disagreed.  He disagreed with Judge Easterbrook’s reading of earlier 
Seventh Circuit cases, he disagreed with Easterbrook’s failure to circulate the opinion 
prior to creating a circuit split, and, most importantly, he disagreed with Easterbrook’s 
assumption that market forces could be relied on to keep fees in check.   
Before going too deeply into Posner’s opinion, it’s worth recalling the setting in 
which he was writing.  It was 2009.  This was the year after Bear Stearns and AIG were 
bailed out; after Lehman Brothers failed and markets went into a tailspin. It was also deep 
into the greatest recession the country had experienced since the Great Depression. 
Americans were losing jobs and facing record numbers of foreclosures.  Occupy Wall 
Street was going strong, as was the narrative of the crisis that had spawned it.  The system 
is rigged; the rich get richer as the poor get poorer.  Wall Street gets saved while Main 
Street suffers.  Bankers had brought the country to the brink with their greed and 
shenanigans, yet not one was going to jail for it.  It was in this environment that Judge 
Posner read Judge Easterbrook’s opinion about the power of market forces and the 
problems of judicial intervention.  It was against this background that Posner set about 
crafting a very different narrative.    
You want to talk executive compensation?, Posner asks, alright, let’s look at 
executive compensation.  Let’s examine the “growing indications that executive 
compensation in large publicly traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of 
boards of directors to police compensation.”16  Note how much is packed into this 
sentence.  According to Posner, executive compensation is broken.  CEOs, Posner tells us, 
are “often” paid too much.  This is not just an acknowledgment that markets are 
imperfect; it is a suggestion that they are flawed.  And those flaws are evidenced in 																																																								
13 Id at 632. 
14 Id. 
15 Id at 634. 
16 Jones v Harris Associates LP, 537 F3d 728, 730 (2008) (Posner dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (emphasis added). 
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research documented in works about “Pay without Performance” and “Cronyism,” and 
summed in newspaper articles on “the Imperial CEO” and how “In the Boardroom, 
Every Back Gets Scratched.”17  Posner then goes onto explain why Easterbrook’s 
assumptions, ones that Posner might once have shared, have been revealed to be so 
erroneous.  He talks about boardrooms full of executives who have a greater interest in 
protecting a world order that allows for excessive compensation, and the way 
compensation consulting are used to let boards off the hook for those decisions.  
Posner goes on to explain: “Competition in product and capital markets can’t be 
counted on to solve the problem because the same structure of incentives operates on all 
large corporations and similar entities, including mutual funds.”18  He quotes research on 
mutual funds finding that “business connections can mitigate agency conflicts,” but they 
can also function as “channels for inefficient favoritism.”19  This is Posner not just giving 
voice to the plaintiffs in the suit, but speaking to the frustrations with finance that 
permeated public discourse of the time.  And he’s frank about the importance of the 
timing.  As he explains, “[m]utual funds are a component of the financial services 
industry, where abuses have been rampant,” and are “more evident now.”20   He is 
talking about finance as a site of bad behavior, a domain where market processes and 
participants cannot be trusted.  He is implicitly invoking the crisis to say that we now know 
better.  Market forces are not just imperfect, as Easterbrook concedes, they are flawed.   
“The governance structure that enables mutual fund advisers to charge exorbitant fees is 
industry-wide.”21  Exorbitant fees.  Exorbitant.   
Posner need not have gone this far.  He could have noted that Easterbrook’s 
approach created a circuit split, and merited further consideration accordingly. Instead, 
Posner took Easterbrook’s narrative as his starting point, and he flipped that narrative on 
its head.  Like the good pragmatist he purports to be, Posner used experience rather than 
theory as his starting point.  And he tells us that experience shows the system is corrupt.  
Executives are overpaid; finance full of tricksters.  So maybe, just maybe, there is role for 
the judiciary after all.  
To be sure, Posner does not provide a satisfying explanation of what Section 36(b) 
obligations ought to entail, or the appropriate role of courts in adjudicating excessive fee 
claims.  In taking Easterbrook’s opinion as a starting point, he also reiterates a range of 
institutionally flawed analogies.  There may be agency costs and other flaws in both the 																																																								
17 Id (citing Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise 
of Executive Compensation 23–24 (2004); Ivan E. Brick et al, CEO Compensation, Director 
Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism, 12 J Corp Finance 403 (2006); Gary 
Wilson, How to Rein in the Imperial CEO, Wall Street Journal A15 (July 9, 2008); Ben Stein, 
In the Boardroom, Every Back Gets Scratched, NY Times B9 (Apr 6, 2008)).   
18 Id. 
19 Id (quoting Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the 
Mutual Fund Industry (Mar 1, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=849705 (visited on July 28, 
2008), subsequently published as Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the 
Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J Finance 2185 (2009)). 
20 Id. 
21 Id at 732. 
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processes through which executive compensation and mutual fund fees are established, 
but those processes are sufficiently different that the comparison probably adds more 
confusion than clarity to the matter.  Nonetheless, putting the opinion—or rather 
dissent—in context, excuses at least some of these flaws.  Not all opinions can or should 
fill the same function.  Posner doesn’t have the votes to make law.  All he has is the option 
to explain why the case merits further attention; why the opinion, as decided, is wrong.  
And knowing full well that his court sits one step down from the top of the federal 
judiciary hierarchy, his aim seems clear: Explain to those up above why they should agree 
to hear the case.  
c. SCOTUS Chimes In 
The Supreme Court did indeed grant certiorari in Harris to resolve the question of 
the fiduciary obligations that a mutual fund adviser owes pursuant to Section 36(b).  
Consistent with Supreme Court Rule 10, and the structural understanding of the judicial 
system underlying this essay, that decision reflected a view by at least four members of the 
Court that the state of the law, not the correctness or incorrectness of the decision below, 
justified the Court’s attention.22  In further recognition of the distinct role of the Supreme 
Court, academics, industry groups and others, including the Solicitor General, submitted 
fourteen amici brief in which they provided thorough analyses of the issues at stake.23  As 
one of these briefs, submitted by a group of law professors, explained: “By declining to 
define ‘fiduciary duty’ in Section 36(b), … Congress ceded to the federal courts the duty of 
imbuing this concept with operational meaning.”24  Judging by the Court’s opinion, this 
exhortation fell largely on deaf ears.     
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court rejected Judge 
Easterbrook’s approach.25 The Court concluded that Garternberg “has provided a workable 
standard for nearly three decades,” and should be affirmed as the appropriate standard 
accordingly.  It did so despite the fact, acknowledged by Justice Thomas in concurrence, 
that in those three decades, “no excessive fee suit has ever produced a verdict for 
plaintiffs.”26  As further pointed out by Justice Thomas in concurrence, the Court also 
failed to address directly the tension between the language in Garternberg, which seems to 
empower courts to exercise significant judgment with respect to the fairness of fees 
charged, with many subsequent lower court decisions take a much narrower approach 
despite paying lip service to Garternberg.  
The vagueness that permeates much of the opinion gives way to clarity on one 
point.  The Supreme Court disapproved of the back and forth between Easterbrook and 
Posner below.  In Alito’s view: “The debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and the 																																																								
22 Rules of the Supreme Court (2013). 
23 See generally Jones v. Harris Associates: SCOTUSblog Coverage and Jones v. Harris Associates: 
Amicus Briefs, SCOTUSblog (2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jones-v-
harris-associates/. 
24 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, Jones v Harris Associates 
LP, No 08-586 9 (US filed June 15, 2010). 
25 Jones v Harris Associates LP, 559 US 335, 343. 
26 Quinn Curtis and John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Litigation: 
Do the Merits Matter?, 30 J L Econ & Org 275, 277 (2014). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333218 
	 8	
dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding today’s mutual fund market is a matter for 
Congress, not the courts.”27   In his view, it seems, examining the mutual fund 
marketplace in order to understand the context in which mutual fund fees are set the 
effect of excessive fee litigation on that process is not a matter for judges, or at least not in 
the way Easterbrook and Posner approached it. 
II.  Putting Jones in context   
As he extensive briefing reflects, there were a number of important issues before 
the Court in Jones. The Court’s opinion answered few of them.  In a piece summed up in 
its title, The Downside of Judicial Restraint: The (Non-)Effect of Jones v. Harris, John Coates 
bemoans that in “cho[osing] to give little additional meaningful guidance to lower courts 
on what factors to use,” when evaluating a Section 36(b) claim, the “primary 
beneficiaries” of the Supreme Court’s decision are likely to be lawyers who bring and 
defend against such claims.28   In other subsequent work, Quinn Curtis and John Morley, 
explain the myriad reasons that even after Jones, “[e]xcessive fee liability has been 
implemented so poorly that the questions about its abstract value are almost beside the 
point.”29  In companion empirical work, they find that the size of a fund adviser is a more 
powerful predictor of whether it has faced suit than the relative size of the fees it charges.  
“[A]nd perhaps most importantly,” they “found no evidence that fees declined in funds 
after they had been targeted by section 36(b) suits. This is disappointing,” given that one 
“goal of section 36(b) is … to reduce fees going forward.”30  
Given how little impact Jones seemed to have on Section 36(b) litigation, it might 
be tempting to dismiss the case, and Posner’s role in it, as having little import.  Why 
bother writing a heated dissent from a petition that is usually denied as a matter of 
course?  Why anger colleagues and invite censure from the Supreme Court?  The 
remainder of this paper explores why, for Posner, there was no other way. And, by 
examining the three opinions in Jones in context, it suggests that the law is better off 
because of it. 
a. An aside 
I do not write as a dispassionate observer of Judge Posner.  I write, instead, as a 
former clerk, one who can still vividly recall where I was sitting in the Stanford Law 
library when I opened an email from Judge Posner inviting me to come to interview for a 
clerkship in his chambers.  Time froze.  And in ways that I could not have fathomed at 
the time, my response to that email set off a chain of events that transformed the life that 
followed.  Although I will not recount here the many reasons I am forever indebted to 
Judge Posner, that gratitude inevitably colors my analysis.  I smile whenever I read his 
words, never quite sure if it is because of the beauty of his prose or the way those words 
bring him to life before me.  I raise this not only to admit my biases, but because specific 
experiences I had as a clerk shape my understanding of Judge Posner, and sharing a few 
such moments can shed helpful additional light on who he is and how he judged.    																																																								
27 Jones, 559 US at 353. 
28 Coates, 6 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 59–60 (cited in note 1). 
29 Curtis and Morley, 32 Yale J Reg at 12 (cited in note 1). 
30 Id. 
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By the time I received that fateful email, Posner was a legend.   He was a larger 
than life figure who could loom across continents.  This meant that when Posner the man 
walked into a room, he also had to grapple with the presence of Posner the Legend.  He 
might well have enjoyed this at times, but for someone so eager to learn and engage, 
legendary status can also take away the fun. The last thing he wanted was to spend time 
with otherwise intelligent people rendered moot by his glow.  So, consciously or not, 
Judge Posner had devised a set of tools to help ensure that Posner the Legend remained 
life-sized in conversation, at least when it suited him. I still recall how witty I felt when he 
seemed to laugh heartily during my interview.  Any self satisfaction disappeared quickly 
after I joined chambers, as I observed him use that same laugh time and again to put 
others at ease, in hopes they might then become more interesting.  I told myself that if I 
were ever to write a biography of Richard A. Posner, which I won’t, I would title it, 
“Dick’s Laugh,” for that laugh, and his unusual insistence that his clerks address him by 
his first name, and a nickname at that, embody his unique approach to judging.  He was 
a pragmatist and a visionary, as all know, but he was a particular breed of pragmatic 
visionary—one who knew where he stood, or at least had some sense of those contours.  
b. Three opinions, three approaches to judging 
With this background, we can revisit the three opinions in Jones, stylizing each 
approach just a bit, and putting each in context, to consider the role of different actors in 
the judicial system given the aim of “good” law.  The claim is that the occasional 
instigator is a good thing for the law. 
a. The Initial Instigator 
In Jones, Judge Easterbrook plays a role that Posner often plays—instigator.  
Confronted with a case that could easily be resolved without stirring any feathers, 
Easterbrook used the case as an opportunity to step back and consider was at stake and 
how the law had gotten to where it had.  To paraphrase, he said, I recognize the word 
“fiduciary,” and based on my three decades on the bench, I don’t think it can bear the 
load that Gartenberg places on it.  I also know something about markets, and something 
about judges, and those experiences suggest that markets are far better than judges at 
determining the appropriate price to pay for mutual fund advisory services.  Congress 
does seem to want courts to play a role, but that role is best understood as complementing 
a market-based regime by ensuring advisers disclose what they charge and don’t engage 
in tricks.  So I will uphold the decision of the district court, but I will also use the case to 
promulgate a new view of the law.   
There are weaknesses to a judge instigating in this fashion.  There is a risk of 
disruption and distraction, particularly if there are too many trying to play this role.  The 
law often exists as it does for a reason.  But put in the context of a multi-layered legal 
system, there are also real benefits to judges occasionally playing this role. In purporting 
to provide answers, Easterbrook was asking questions central to Section 36(b) yet 
relatively unaddressed in the decades of litigation invoking it.  
The law can stagnate when no one is willing to stick his neck out and ask the 
tough questions.  Sometimes the role of instigators is to draw attention to the ways new 
developments, new insights or changing mores render the state of the law ill suited to the 
tasks at hand.  Other times, the role of an instigator is to question whether there was ever 
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a method to the madness embodied in established doctrine.  Law is sometimes the 
byproduct of thoughtful reflection and application, but it can also spread through 
inadvertence and inattention.  Judges are busy.  Dicta in one case can become a holding 
in the next and all that follow without anyone raising the first-order questions that 
animate Easterbrook and Posner in Jones.  In an imperfect system, instigators can make it 
more likely that there is a method to the madness.  The extensive secondary literature on 
Section 36(b) suggests that excessive fee litigation was imposing real costs on large mutual 
funds without having much of a beneficial impact on fee levels.  Given the massive 
growth of mutual funds and other developments since 1982 when Gartenberg was decided, 
the appropriate contours of Section 36(b) liability merited more consideration than it had 
received.31   
ii. Posner as Instigator  
Let’s now turn to Posner, and what makes him such a valuable instigator.  Posner 
was not the initial instigator in Jones, but he was an instigator.  He exercised his vote and 
voice in a procedural setting when such tools are rarely used.  He was not assigned to 
Jones.  He had the option of staying out of the matter completely.  But he didn’t.  Instead, 
he authored an opinion that had no legal force for little reason other than to explain why 
the case mattered, and why the opinion should not stand.  This took time, attention, and 
the willingness to offend a colleague. We can never know the counterfactual, but we do 
know that his gambit worked.  His opinion helped get the attention of the public and the 
Supreme Court, and led to Easterbrook’s opinion being reversed. 
Although speculative, it is possible that Posner’s gambit may had other payoffs as 
well. Academics are again taking up the question of the appropriate role of law in 
checking mutual fund fees.32  Moreover, since 2009, there has been a significant shift 
from actively managed mutual funds and into more cost effective alternatives like index 
funds.  The crisis surely helped spur this shift and the trend started before Jones, so other 
forces are at play.33  Nonetheless, the trend is more pronounced in the United States than 
elsewhere, leaving open the possibility that Jones may have played a contributory role in 
drawing the public’s attention to the mismatch between the fees they were paying and the 
value they were receiving.34 
Returning to his influence inside the judicial system, Posner is a self identified 
pragmatist.  For him, pragmatism is “an approach to decision making that emphasizes 																																																								
31 See Morley and Curtis, 120 Yale L J at 84 (cited in note 1); Curtis and Morley, Yale J 
Reg at 1 (cited in note 1); Coates, 6 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 58 (cited in note 1); 
John C. Coates IV and R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence 
and Implications for Policy, 33 J Corp L 151 (2007); William A. Birdthistle, Investment 
Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U Ill L Rev 61 (2010); 
Brief for Amici Curiae, Professor Deborah A. DeMott and Professor Mark L. Ascher, in 
Support of Petitioners, Jones v Harris Associates LP, No 08-586 (US filed June 17, 2010); 
Brief of Law and Finance Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Jones v Harris Associates 
LP, No 08-586 (US filed Sept 3, 2009). 
32 See notes 1, 30. 
33 Sushko and Turner, Implications of Passive Investing at 114 (cited in note 2). 
34 Id at 116. 
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consequences over doctrine”35 and pragmatic judges are “[j]udges who don't insist that a 
legalistic algorithm will decide every case.”36  Pragmatism as he practiced it thus means 
both a way of judging and a way of owning those judgments.  One cannot be separated 
from the other.   
This understanding of what judges ought to do goes to the core of Posner’s, 
sometimes harsh, exchanges with Justice Scalia.  In Posner’s view, the law does not just 
allow, but requires judges to exercise judgment.  This does not mean ignoring text or 
precedent.  It is about the need for law, statutory or otherwise, to be interpreted, brought 
to life, and given meaning by judges.  It is about a legal system that relies on judges who 
are human and who see the humanity of those before and around them.  It is about being 
willing to exercise judgment, and being frank about those judgments.  
Posner doesn’t engage in subterfuge, well-meaning or otherwise, when deciding a 
case.  He makes his rationales plain, allowing other judges, other lawmakers, and anyone 
else who might be interested, to assess for themselves the issues at stake.  This comes 
through in Jones, in Posner’s embrace of what the crisis revealed regarding the pervasive 
problems plaguing finance.  It also comes through in his willingness to look to recent work 
on the myriad reasons that market forces cannot be trusted as fully as he himself once 
believed.  He was capable of having his thinking evolve in light of new evidence, and his 
assessment of thee issues before him shaped by the zeitgeist of the moment, because that is 
part of what he assumes a good judge does.  He looks at the text, but he does not blind 
himself to realities apparent only by looking away from the text to the litigants before the 
court and the world that surrounds them all.  
To be sure, there are plenty of risks in allowing Easterbrook, Posner or others to 
instigate in this manner.  The most pressing may be that in embracing some judicial 
diversity, similar litigants may face different outcomes, undermining one sense of fairness 
that is obviously core to the judiciary.  Instigating, however, need not affect outcomes.  At 
least some of the time when Posner took on this role, and the law as it stood was at odds 
with what he thought it ought to be, he followed precedent while flagging (sometimes 
successfully) why the law was suboptimal.37  Similarly, here, the plaintiffs would have lost 
regardless of the test used to dismiss their claims. 																																																								
35 Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 Cal L Rev 519, 539 
(2012), online at 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2815&context=jour
nal_articles. 
36 Id. 
37 See, for example, Khan v State Oil Co, 93 F3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir 1996) (adhering to 
Supreme Court precedent in Albrecht v Herald Company, 390 US 145 (1968), despite 
criticizing Albrecht’s “increasingly, moth-eaten foundations”—an approach praised by the 
Supreme Court when it subsequently overruled Albrecht, see State Oil Co v Kahn, 522 US 3, 
20 (1997)); Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v Doyle, 162 F3d 463 (7th Cir 1998) (holding 
unconstitutional a Wisconsin law criminalizing partial-birth abortion under the Supreme 
Court’s settled “undue burden” standard but nevertheless noting aspects of the law that 
would fail rational basis review—reasoning adopted in part by a Supreme Court majority 
in Stenberg v Carhart, 530 US 914 (2000)). 
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More importantly, ensuring comparable outcomes in comparable cases is but one 
measure of fairness.  Ensuring that all litigants receive outcomes consistent with the aims 
and design of the law governing their actions is another.  Recognizing the many reasons 
the law on the books can vary from this notion of “good” creates a space, a need, for 
instigators even if it does mean some variation in outcomes.  The analysis here further 
suggests that because no judge has omniscience regarding a law’s aims or effects, a 
pragmatist who openly questions a law’s aims and effects, and who does so from a 
position that is grounded in experience rather than purporting to derive legitimacy from 
on high, may play a particularly important role instigating reconsideration of current 
doctrine. 
iii.  Why stick my neck out when there’s a nice hole in front of me?  
The increasingly normalized sense that judges should not to exercise judgment 
comes through in Alito’s chiding of both Easterbrook and Posner.  Neither suggests a 
reading of Section 36(b) that ignores the text.  They were offering alternative readings of 
that text.  Even Easterbrook, who was closer to the line, grounds much his analysis on the 
meaning of a term—fiduciary—which has long been brought to life through judicial 
lawmaking.  It is also a term, as Alito’s opinion otherwise highlights, that has been given 
different meanings depending on the context, leaving courts no way to avoid the task of 
making meaning in interpreting it.  To be sure, both looked beyond the text, and to 
factors that Alito viewed as inappropriate, but whether judges should ever look up from 
the page is the question at stake in the analysis here.   
True to his critique, Justice Alito shows little indication that his attention has 
strayed too far from the text.  And, rather than forging new ground, Alito hews closely to 
an unsatisfying and ambiguous status quo.  This is different than Sunstein-style 
minimalism, though it might be taken for such.  Minimalism is about scope.  The 
compromises that degrade Alito’s opinion arise not from its narrowness, but from its 
vagueness.  As John Coates nicely summarizes: “In enacting section 36(b), Congress gave 
the federal courts an unappetizing job: to discern limits based on a vaguely stated 
standard on compensation in what is clearly both a conflicted but also competitive 
context. That job necessarily involves exercise of judicial discretion.”38  The Court’s 
opinion was deficient because it “punt[ed] the entire shapeless mess of section 36(b) back 
to the federal district courts” and “squashed the nascent effort by the Seventh Circuit to 
begin th[e] process” of “attempt[ing] to put some order on the chaos invited by the 
statutory standard.”39 
Whatever Congress intended Section 36(b) to achieve, it cannot fulfill that role 
unless it has sufficient flesh for its limits to be cognizable to courts and, more importantly, 
to the boards of directors of mutual funds.  For it is in the boardroom that Section 36(b) 
will succeed or fail in having some impact on the fees that mutual funds, and investors in 
those funds, pay for advisory services.  This is the why Coates is so frustrated.  And 
empirical work, by Coates and others, suggests reason for concern.  Recall, Quinn and 
Morley’s findings suggest that Section 36(b) hasn’t been helpful in reducing fees even at 
those funds that are sued. Section 36(b) may never be a panacea for mutual fund 																																																								
38 Coates, 6 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 64 (cited in note 1). 
39 Id. 
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investors, and excessive fee litigation is not suited to be the primary tool for ensuring that 
mutual fund advisers charge reasonable fees, but Congress added the section for a reason. 
Although Alito rejected Easterbrook’s effort to read it out of the scheme, Alito also turned 
away from the opportunity—recognized as such by amici on both sides of the issue—to 
provide much needed guidance regarding how Section 36(b) ought to function. 
In trying avoid exercising the judgment required to provide meaningful guidance 
regarding when the fees a fund adviser charges are so high as to violate Section 36(b), 
Justice Alito is like a worker saving for retirement who refuses to place his money in 
anything other than a savings account at his local, FDIC insured bank.  He may be 
protected from bank failure and the vagaries of the market, but he is ultimately setting 
himself (but in this case, the law) up to fail.  He is allowing inflation to eat away at his 
spending power and foregoing an opportunity to diversify into assets that, while risky 
individually, have over time consistently provided the much higher returns most workers 
need in order to aggregate the wealth needed to enjoy retirement.  Sometimes what seems 
like the safe path is actually a path toward a slow death.  Posner and Easterbrook took 
positions that recognized this.   
The Court sits at a different place in the legal system, and greater modesty may be 
warranted accordingly.  But modesty can mean many things, and the type of modesty 
that the Court increasingly insists on exercising may in time do more harm than good.  
Congress sometimes wants judges, and regulators, to exercise judgment. There is no 
reason a priori that avoiding such commands is any less disrespectful of Congress than 
decisions to ignore the text altogether.   
Justice Alito seems to suggest that Posner crossed a line in looking beyond the text 
to understand the text.  The opinion echoes a seemingly growing consensus that judges 
can and should be dispassionate, distant and objective to the point of removing who they 
are from the judicial process.  There is something appealing about this in the abstract.  
Wouldn’t the law be more fair, after all, if all those applying it did so uniformly, in a 
manner more akin to a robot than a man?   
The Judge Posner I got to know as a clerk never clung to such illusions.  He may 
have appeared cold to those paying heed to the wrong cues, and, like most members of 
the federal judiciary and most educated white males of his generation, he enjoyed 
privileges of the kind that can blind. But this is where Judge Posner the judge cannot be 
divorced from Dick Posner the person.  Both were constantly observing, and remarkably 
attuned to what they saw.  When deciding a suit challenging a health insurer’s refusal to 
cover bariatric surgery for an insured, Judge Posner rendered a short opinion applying 
established law and deferring to the insurer’s determination.40  But, if I may, he did so 
only after he contemplated and allowed himself open up to what the decision may mean 
for the insured.  He reflected on the gait and possible discomfort of some of the larger 
individuals that he saw walking along the beach in Michigan where he spent many a 
weekend.  He followed the law but not blindly. 
																																																								
40 See Manny v Central States, SE and SW Areas Pension and Health and Welfare Funds, 388 F3d 
241, 246–47 (7th Cir 2004). 
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In addition to seeing those before him, Posner saw himself.  Although no one 
would ever accuse Judge Posner of being a man of the people, he was at least aware that 
he was not. I recall him discussing over lunch the bubble in which he and his colleagues 
lived.   He saw it symbolized in how they moved from home to work.  As he explained it, 
in contrast to most who worked in the Dirksen Building who relied on public 
transportation, most judges drove. They did so because they had the privilege of parking 
in lot directly underneath the building.  Upon exiting their autonomous vehicles, they 
were then shuttled up the building in an elevator reserved just for the judiciary.  They 
could thus move from the comfort of their homes to chambers without interacting with 
anyone, except the guards who ensured their safety, or taking so much as a breath of fresh 
air.  He told the story with the express point of conveying just how insulated a life it is to 
be a federal judge.  He was the butt of the story. 
Judge Posner may have said more absurd things than any other member of the 
federal judiciary during his time on the bench.  As closely as he looked at the world, and 
as much as he saw, there was a lot he didn’t understand.  He too is human and has biases 
that do not always serve.  But he never invoked use the illusion that any man-made 
institution, be it Congress or the judiciary, could be anything other than flawed and 
human to obscure the fact that in each and every case, he was a human being applying 
man-made law in a way that would affect human beings and the evolution of the law.  
It has become trendy for people of power to deny that they have it.  CEOs blame 
shareholders and a skewed interpretation of the law to pretend that they lack agency 
when making decisions that harm workers or others.41  The President blames Congress 
when carrying out an enforcement policy that separates children from their parents at the 
border.  The Treasury Secretary and Chair of the Federal Reserve blame a lack of legal 
authority for the decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail, despite the flexibility they 
found in the law to save other institutions.  A decade passes, and no top executive is 
prosecuted for actions taken leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.42 
Alito’s decision here is less extreme than these examples.  The Jones decision was 
no great injustice. But that doesn’t render it harmless.  When courts, again and again, 
duck the opportunity and obligation to forge law and provide useful clarity, they may 
shield themselves from protests but they also may contribute to a slow erosion of trust in 
the judiciary.43  																																																								
41 Multiple CEOs of drug companies have recently explained massive increases in the 
pricing of critical drugs as obligated by duties to their shareholders.  Chris Matyszczy, 
Move Over, Martin Shkreli. This CEO Says It's His 'Moral' Imperative to Raise a Drug's 
Price By 400 Percent, Inc., Sept. 11, 2018, https://www.inc.com/chris-
matyszczyk/move-over-martin-shkreli-this-ceo-says-its-his-moral-imperative-to-raise-a-
drugs-price-by-400-percent.html. 
42 Jesse Eisinger, The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to Prosecute 
Executives (2017). 
43 As Lawrence Lessig has explained, we are at a historical moment when the public’s 
trust in institutions is faltering, in significant part because of a slow erosion, or 
“corruption,” of institutions that are meant to play important public roles.  The 
combination of judicial avoidance with an exacerbated tendency to disguise the rationales 
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Conclusion 
Small-c conservatism has an important role to play in the process of judging.  
Continuity and consistency in the law requires respect for text and adherence to 
precedent.  We should all be grateful that the judiciary is not constituted of carbon copies 
of Judge Posner.  But it is possible that we are locking up too much of the law in a savings 
account, only to have it diminish in stature and meaning over time.  I am fearful that the 
tendency of so many, in and outside the law, to defer to institutions and commands as 
somehow outside themselves, is contributing to a slow decay that is eating away at the 
social core of these bodies.   
Judges are not and should not be robots. What they do is not and cannot be rote.  
Judges at their best respect their role as something larger than themselves, deferring to 
text, precedent and other constraints accordingly, but also embracing the humanity, 
quirks, and even warts of all of the constituents whose collective actions contribute to this 
corpus we call law.  There will never be another judge like Judge Posner, but for the sake 
of the law, I hope that a few more life-sized, larger than life figures come to the fore. 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
for that avoidance may be contributing to this institutional corruption.  Lawrence Lessig, 
America Compromised (2018). 
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